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T

he American government’s preventive
counterterrorism strategy is no secret.1 Weeks
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, then-Attorney
General John Ashcroft declared, “Our single
objective is to prevent terrorist attacks by taking
suspected terrorists off the street. Let the terrorists
among us be warned: If you overstay your visa – even
by one day – we will arrest you. If you violate a local
law, you will be put in jail and kept in custody as long
as possible. We will use every available statute. We will
seek every prosecutorial advantage.”2
As the government adopted a no-tolerance policy,
a fear-stricken public watched as images of nefarious
dark-skinned, bearded Muslims flashed across millions
of television screens. The message was, if there had
ever been any doubt, the 9/11 attacks confirmed that
Muslims and Arabs are inherently violent and intent
upon destroying the American way of life. Heightened
scrutiny of these communities was thus perceived not
only as warranted, but also as a rational3 response to
an existential threat to the country.
Ten years later, the 9/11 terrorist attacks appear
to have succeeded in transforming the American
way of life for the worse.4 In our hasty passage of
the expansive PATRIOT Act, our fears gave way to
the government’s demand for unfettered discretion
to preserve national security at the expense of civil
liberties for all Americans. As a consequence, the
United States has adopted practices commonly found
in police states where government surveillance extends
into almost every aspect of life.5

Body scans at airports strip us of our privacy. Fusion
centers have sprung up across the country to gather and
deposit intelligence on average Americans in massive
government-monitored databases.6 Warrantless National
Security Letters are used to obtain information about
our financial and political lives, despite the absence of
any evidence of criminal activity.7 Police departments
have shifted resources from fighting crime to mapping

Ten years later, the 9/11 terrorist
attacks appear to have succeeded
in transforming the American
way of life for the worse.
communities based on their religion and ethnic origins
under the auspices of protecting national security.8 The
overreaching enforcement of broad “material support
to terrorism” laws has chilled religiously mandated
charitable giving and hampered humanitarian aid
operations, thereby eroding the independence of the
American nonprofit sector and unduly politicizing
humanitarian assistance.9 And fears of “homegrown
terrorism,” fueled by irresponsible Congressional
rhetoric,10 have legitimized a bigoted discourse on
the country’s Muslims to such an extent that some
Americans challenge Islam’s status as a bona fide
religion deserving of constitutional protection.11
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Aggressive prosecutions of Muslim
charities and individuals across
the country have embittered

communities that feel besieged

by their government and distrusted
by their non-Muslim compatriots.

While post-9/11 preventive counterterrorism policies
have adversely impacted various groups of Americans,
no group has been as deeply affected as the Muslim
community, especially its Arab and South Asian
members.12 Mosque infiltration has become so rampant
that congregants assume they are under surveillance
as they fulfill their spiritual and religious obligations.13
Government informants have ensnared numerous
seemingly hapless and unsophisticated young men,
thereby sowing distrust among Muslims.14 Aggressive
prosecutions of Muslim charities and individuals across
the country have embittered communities that feel
besieged by their government and distrusted by their
non-Muslim compatriots.15 As most clearly evinced
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in the vitriolic discourse surrounding the Park 51
Community Center in lower Manhattan during 2010,
selective counterterrorism enforcement has also fueled
public bias against Muslims.16 As a consequence, the
vibrancy and development of civil society within these
communities is at risk of being significantly stunted.
This article focuses on the use of material support
laws in the counterterrorism preventive paradigm and
the significant risk they pose to the civil rights and
civil liberties of those communities most targeted:
Muslim Arabs and South Asians. The wide-reaching
and devastating effects of these broadly interpreted
material support laws on American Muslim charities
and their donors, as well as on the broader American
nonprofit sector, has effectively criminalized otherwise
legitimate charitable giving, peace-building efforts, and
human rights advocacy.
To the extent that these groups are the “miner’s
canary”17 in forecasting the post-9/11 loss of civil
rights and liberties for all Americans, their experiences
demonstrate the United States’ downward progression
away from the Founding Fathers’ vision of a society where
individuals can speak, assemble, and practice their faith
free of government intervention or persecution.18

Using Material Support
as a Preventive
Counterterrorism Tool
The linchpin of the preventive counterterrorism
paradigm consists of those laws that prohibit providing
material support to terrorism. These laws are often
the fall-back criminal provisions employed when the
government cannot prove terrorism charges. But they
are so broad and vaguely worded that they effectively
criminalize a myriad of activities that would otherwise be
constitutionally protected. Moreover, as the government
is not statutorily required to prove that the defendant had
a specific intent to support terrorism, it has carte blanche
to prosecute a broad range of legitimate activities, such
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as charitable giving, peace building, and human rights
advocacy. The Department of Justice, with the Supreme
Court’s blessing, has consequently criminalized
training and advocacy in support of nonviolence on the
justification that such activities legitimize a designated
group or individual.19 The government’s standards for
what it deems as “legitimizing”20 are so broad that thenSolicitor General Elena Kagan went so far as to call for
prosecuting lawyers for filing an amicus brief on behalf
of a terrorist organization.21
Similarly, humanitarian aid delivered to noncombatant
civilians living under the control of a terrorist organization
can be illegal based upon the unproven theory that
it frees up resources to redirect toward violence.
This untenable theory of liability, also known as the
“fungibility” doctrine,22 punitively denies many innocent
beneficiaries abroad of food, water, and shelter. But
for their misfortune of being trapped in a conflict zone
where one party is designated as terrorist, these civilians
would have received much-needed aid from American
civil society. Furthermore, Muslim American charities
providing the humanitarian aid are punished through
government-led smear campaigns23 and prosecutions.

Disproportionate Enforcement
against Muslim Charities

W

ith few exceptions, the executive branch has
exercised its broad discretion to selectively
target Muslim charities engaged in seemingly legitimate
humanitarian aid.24 The result is a serious chilling effect
on Muslim communities’ willingness to openly partake
in political dissent and for Muslim charities to effectively
provide international aid using religiously mandated
charitable donations to places like Somalia.25
Since 9/11, Muslim donors have been scared to make
such contributions because they fear prosecution for
providing material support to terrorism even though
they do not intend to support terrorism. They also fear
that their donations will invite government scrutiny and
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harassment in the form of tax audits, immigration checks,
requests for voluntary FBI interviews, inclusion on watch
lists, and surveillance.26 Indeed, donations to Muslim
charities fell precipitously in the years immediately
following 9/11. 27 As law enforcement increasingly
questions Muslims about such donations during
voluntary interviews, immigration benefit proceedings,
and at the border, this chilling effect is magnified.28 Ten
years after 9/11, many Muslim charities still struggle to
return to pre-9/11 donation levels.29
The government’s closure and designation as terrorist
of three of the largest Muslim American charities
in the first three months after the 9/11 attacks sent
shockwaves through Muslim communities nationwide.30
In December 2001 during Ramadan, when Muslim
charitable giving is at its yearly peak, the government
froze the assets of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief
and Development, the Global Relief Foundation, and
the Benevolence International Foundation. 31 The
subsequent criminal prosecution of their officers,
board members, employees, and even contracted
fundraisers in the United States alarmed Muslim
donors, who reasonably feared that even the most
tenuous association with a Muslim charity could lead
to ruinous consequences.32 Currently, seven out of the
nine charities shut down as a result of terrorism-related
investigation or designation are Muslim charities.33

Shutting Down Charities
Based on Mere Allegations

U

nbeknownst to many, a formal terrorist designation
is not necessary to figuratively tar and feather a
charity. A mere investigation by the Department of
Treasury is enough to trigger the asset-freezing provision
of sanctions laws,34 thus paralyzing the organization. The
law does not require the Treasury Department to have
probable cause of a violation of the regulations, nor is
it required to seek approval from a judge, either before
or after the freeze is imposed. The investigation and

ISPU

resulting freeze have no limits. The ensuing public media
coverage then puts the nail in the organization’s coffin,
as any individual’s subsequent association with it is an
invitation for government scrutiny, if not prosecution.
Before December 2010, such organizations were denied
access to their funds to hire a defense lawyer unless
the Department of Treasury, the adverse party in any
litigation, authorized such expenditures. The department
often approved small amounts that were a fraction of
the cost of hiring competent counsel.35
Despite numerous requests to allow lawyers to
represent the accused without a license, new regulations
were issued only after the American Civil Liberties Union
and Center for Constitutional Rights challenged the
existing regulations in connection with the Al-Aulaqi
suit.36 Prior to the change, attorneys were permitted to
provide uncompensated legal services to designated
terrorist organizations without first obtaining a license
from OFAC under a very limited set of circumstances.37
Compensated services were also severely restricted,
permitting charities to only fund their legal services
through money raised outside the U.S. or, after obtaining
a license, money raised by legal defense funds.38
The new regulations, issued in December 2010 in
response to the Al-Aulaqi litigation, finally permitted
American lawyers to provide pro bono representation
in any proceeding before a court of agency (federal,
state, or local), without obtaining a license.39 The
new regulations also permit charities or persons to
pay for legal services without obtaining a license if
the services involve, among other things, counseling
on the requirements of compliance with American
law, representation of persons named as defendants
in American legal proceedings, and “any other legal
services where U.S. law requires access to legal
counsel at public expense.”40 However, if the needed
legal services are not pro bono and do not fall into the
categories of exceptions, the charity or person must
still obtain a license.
In addition to the seven shut down Muslim American
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charities,41 another six have found themselves at the
center of publicly announced terrorism investigations,
raids, and surveillance.42 Unable to overcome the
resulting stigma and blacklisting, two of them have
permanently closed without ever being designated as
terrorist organizations.43

Guilt Without Proof
of Wrongdoing

D

espite the statute’s clear meaning, some courts
have interpreted material support laws in a way
that relieves prosecutors from having to prove that a
charity provided donations directly to a designated
foreign terrorist organization.
In the Holy Land Foundation criminal case, a federal
district court in Texas instructed the jury that provision
of humanitarian aid to non-governmental groups
abroad not designated as terrorist organizations makes
American charities and their officers guilty of material
support to terrorism if those groups are later shown to
be fronts for, or controlled by, a designated terrorist
organization.44 Defendants were convicted based on
their donations to local zakat committees45 that provided
direct humanitarian aid to impoverished Palestinians in
the West Bank and Gaza. The zakat committees, which
are not designated terrorist organizations, were the
indigenous nonprofit organizations with the necessary
network to distribute aid. Indeed, the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the
International Red Cross (IRC) often worked with the
same zakat committees to deliver aid to Palestinians.46
Despite USAID and IRC’s similar work in the
Palestinian territories, the Holy Land Foundation (HLF)
and its Muslim officers were convicted of providing
material support to Hamas, a designated terrorist group,
on account of donations to the undesignated zakat
committees. The trial court erroneously instructed
the jury that if some individuals in some of the zakat
committees had some association with Hamas, these

ISPU

donations constituted prohibited material support to
Hamas, even if the American charity lacked knowledge
of such associations. Although the government could not
prove that HLF’s donations were transferred to Hamas or
that HLF knew or should have known of some of these
committees’ alleged ties to Hamas, it was found guilty
based on its contribution to the undesignated groups.
This tenuous, and arguably unconstitutional, theory of
liability ultimately exposes all American humanitarian aid
agencies operating in conflict zones where designated
terrorist groups exist. That USAID can engage in the
same activity without sanction further evinces the
politicization of humanitarian aid.
The serious legal implications caused twenty of the
United States’ largest nonprofits and foundations to file
an amicus brief in the Holy Land Foundation case asking
the Fifth Circuit to interpret the material support statute to
require proof of knowledge that a recipient of assistance
is a designated group or is controlled by one.47 Amici
argued that the district court’s jury instructions denied
individuals fair notice of what is prohibited and failed
to require proof of individual culpability. If the district
court’s flawed interpretation is upheld on appeal, they
argued, it “would jeopardize the legitimate charitable
work of countless foundations and charities throughout
the United States.”48 Specifically, the material support
statute’s reach would expand exponentially such that all
organizations engaged in humanitarian assistance would
be exposed to prosecution.49 Ultimately, the chilling
effect would devastate their important work and deny
beneficiaries humanitarian aid.50
Notably, the amici included such large and reputable
nonprofit organizations as the Carter Center, the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Constitution Project,
the Council on Foundations, and the Samuel Rubin
Foundation.51 Their participation demonstrates these
laws’ broader adverse consequences, notwithstanding
their selective enforcement against Muslim groups and
individuals. Ultimately, the Department of Treasury and
the Department of Justice’s refusal to transition from
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their current draconian strategy to a transparent and
fair process collectively weakens American civil society.
Although material support laws were initially enforced
against Muslim communities, aggressive prosecution has
since spread to other groups as the government seeks to
convince the public that it is actively protecting national
security. The 2010 Supreme Court ruling in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project brought to light the broadreaching adverse implications of the laws prohibiting
material support to terrorism. The plaintiffs, a former
federal administrative law judge and American-based
advocacy groups, sought to train the Kurdistan Workers’
Party in Turkey (PKK), a designated foreign terrorist
organization.52 While the PKK engaged in violent activities,
the plaintiffs expressly sought to train members on how
to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully
resolve disputes and petition for humanitarian relief before
the United Nations and other representative bodies.53
To the dismay of many peace building and humanitarian
aid organizations, the Supreme Court found that the law
criminalizing the plaintiffs’ activities is constitutional.54 In
a stinging dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the majority’s
failure to differentiate between aiding terrorist groups that
engage in violent terrorist acts and those that participate
in legitimate democracy-building advocacy that, in
effect, decreases terrorism.55 The ruling criminalized
the plaintiffs’ efforts to stop the groups’ violent activities
and promote peaceful advocacy, thereby making it illegal
for Americans to teach groups to put down their guns,
pick up their pens, invoke international human rights
law, and seek redress through international tribunals.
The criminalization of aid and advocacy directly
contradicts our nation’s stated commitment to
international human rights law and sends a message
to the world that the United States is not serious about
human rights and peaceful conflict resolution. Moreover,
the ruling undermines American civil society, for its
independent nonprofit sector plays a pivotal role in
international peace-building efforts and the provision
of humanitarian aid to impoverished civilians trapped
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in conflict zones.56 However, the Court’s interpretation
of the material support laws now limits international
peace-building efforts to highly politicized, and often
ineffective, government programs sponsored by the
U.S. Department of State or USAID.
Ultimately, this current formulation and interpretation
of material support laws undermines our nation’s
reputation in the international community, our national
security interests in minimizing violence and terrorism
abroad, and our own civil society.57

Collateral Prosecution
and the Surveillance of
Muslim Donors

W

hile few individual donors have been prosecuted
for material support arising out of the charities’
prosecutions,58 many have experienced collateral
prosecution59 on account of their donations to charities
under investigation or being prosecuted.60 The resulting
fear of collateral adverse consequences is striking and
significantly undermines donors’ confidence in the
government’s interest in protecting their fundamental
right to religious freedom.61 Muslim donors worry that
once the government becomes aware of their donations
to Muslim charities, especially to those engaged in
humanitarian relief efforts abroad, they will become
targets of investigation and prosecution. They fear
that the government uses the donor lists of charities,
either designated or under investigation, as a starting
point for investigating terrorism, even if they have no
individualized evidence of wrongdoing.62 Hence these
lists are suspected of serving as the starting point for
fishing expeditions in search of terrorists.
Unlikely a coincidence, major donors have
experienced burdensome tax audits, denials of
citizenship applications, deportation proceedings, and
surveillance.63 Major donors have also been targeted
for interviews regarding their donations and knowledge
of Muslim charities’ activities locally and nationally.64
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Complaints about such targeting have been documented
by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Asian
Law Caucus, Muslim Advocates, the Arab American
Anti-Discrimination Committee, and other advocacy
groups representing these communities.65 Some of these
interviews are involuntary, as they occur at the border
when individuals attempt to return from abroad.66 Others
are a result of ubiquitous FBI requests for voluntary
interviews, which many community members accept
without legal representation as an earnest, but ill-advised,
gesture to prove their innocence. The ACLU, for instance,
has documented reports of law enforcement targeting
Muslim donors in Texas, Michigan, New York, Virginia,
Florida, Louisiana, California, Minnesota, Missouri, and
Wisconsin through “voluntary” interviews.67 Many of
the interviews resulted in criminal charges for material
false statements unrelated to terrorist activities.68
Such non-terrorist-related charges have confirmed the
community’s concerns about selective prosecution due
to one’s religious and/or political beliefs.
These fears of increased government scrutiny and
surveillance are fueled by a prevalent perception that
the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and local
police agents are omnipresent in mosques in cities
with large Muslim populations.69 Muslim congregants
have complained to advocacy groups of FBI informants
infiltrating their mosques to monitor speech, sermons,
and charitable giving within the mosque.70 For instance,
the FBI continued to monitor a mosque in Albany for
years after 9/11, despite arresting and deporting the
original target of the investigation.71 Agents even went
so far as to install cameras aimed at the mosque’s
front and rear entrances with questions of whether
the mosque was also bugged going unanswered.72
Moreover, congregants report being pressured to serve
as informants in exchange for relief from heightened
governmental scrutiny.73 Numerous news reports on
coercive recruitment tactics and pervasive mosque
surveillance reinforce Muslims’ perceptions that the FBI
monitors donations given in the mosque.74 The adverse
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effect of this discriminatory targeting of American Muslim
charities providing humanitarian aid to Muslim regions
abroad does more than just chill religious freedom;75 it
undermines the country’s credibility in its publicized
outreach initiative to Muslims and ultimately impedes its
foreign policy prerogatives in the Middle East. Moreover,
Muslims abroad view such treatment as a litmus test
of American sincerity vis-à-vis its various international
initiatives, such as democratization projects, the defense
of human rights, and the strengthening of civil society.
When they see discrimination against Muslims in the
United States, they reasonably question the legitimacy
of its proclaimed leadership in supporting liberal
democratic ideals. Such double-talk, therefore, renders
this country irrelevant at best, or obstructionist at worst,
in international forums addressing anti-discrimination,
human rights, and the rule of law.

Feasible Solutions Rejected
by the Government

I

n response to this draconian process, the Charity &
Security Network, a broad coalition of highly regarded
nonprofit organizations, has urged the Department of
Treasury to implement due process protections during
the designation and investigation process.76
Current law prevents a designated nonprofit
organization from meaningfully defending itself.77 The
organization is designated and its assets frozen without
notice or opportunity to defend itself before the fact. The
absence of a mechanism comparable to the Classified
Information Procedures Act used in the criminal context
that allows defendants to confront classified evidence
prevents the nonprofit organization from reviewing the
entire record of evidence used against it for designation.
Nor is it permitted to offer evidence in its own defense
at the pre-designation or federal appeals phase.78 Such
minimal due process rights undermine the legitimacy of
the process. Indeed some question whether designation
is more about politics than the law.79
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Rather than adopt a draconian designation
process that assumes guilt without the benefit of the
organization’s defense, designated groups should
be afforded a meaningful opportunity to defend
themselves promptly in the wake of an asset freeze.
This would require the government to disclose sufficient
information regarding its classified case. It should also
be obligatory for the government to provide notice of
the charges and a statement of the reasons, neither
of which is currently required.
Thoughtful solutions by highly skilled attorneys have
been proposed on numerous occasions and blithely
dismissed by Department of Treasury and White House
officials. Officials often cite the ease with which an
organization may transfer money abroad to avoid having
its assets frozen for illicit acts.80 While such concerns
are reasonable, they too can be addressed without
compromising the nonprofit organization’s due process
rights. An independent conservator could be appointed
to oversee the charity’s finances pending investigation.
This option assures the government that funds will not be
transferred abroad out of their jurisdiction and prevents
the collective punishment of the entire organization, as
well as its donors and beneficiaries, on account of mere
allegations. Likewise, its investigations should adopt the
same investigative techniques applied to corporations
suspected of fraud, where the focus is on individual bad
actors rather than the entire corporation. So long as the
organization can show that it has acted in good faith
and any wrongdoing was a result of a limited number
of individuals, it should be spared total liquidation. This
more reasonable approach not only protects charitable
organizations, but also those of its beneficiaries who are
in desperate need of humanitarian assistance.
Additionally, while the new regulations permitting a
charity to pay for particular legal services are welcome,
there is little justification for the government’s continued
refusal to allow the undesignated charity access to its
funds for those services that are not the focus of the
investigation. Especially in the case of large charities,
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operations expand into various countries, whereas the
government’s concerns may be limited to only operations
in a particular country or related to a specific project. The
government has yet to provide a reasonable explanation,
other than its punitive preventive philosophy, for shutting
down an entire organization rather than stopping
the activity being investigated. Moreover, once the
government freezes the funds it refuses all requests to
release them to other charitable organizations performing
the same work in accordance with the cy pres principle.81
Tellingly, the government would rather keep the funds
frozen indefinitely with no regard for the needs of intended
beneficiaries. Such contradictions evince the politicization
of counterterrorism that, thus far, has most adversely
impacted Muslim charities and donors.
At stake is far more than the due process rights
of a particular organization and the sustainability of
the nonprofit sector – both of which are important in
their own right. But equally significant is the legitimacy
of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism strategy.
The material support laws and terrorist designation
process has become unduly politicized as shown by
overreaching, if not outright abusive, enforcement.
It is long overdue for the government to acknowledge
failings of the designation regime and give serious thought
to the thoughtful recommendations of the nonprofit sector.82

Conclusion

T

en years after 9/11, the American government’s
preventative counterterrorism strategy has cost
millions of taxpayer dollars, diverted thousands of law
enforcement personnel away from preventing nonterrorism-related crimes, and failed to prevent terrorist
attacks committed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Rather than engage in responsible governance and
reassess failed strategies, it continues to employ fearbased narratives to persuade the public to keep pouring
billions of dollars into flawed and ineffective national
security projects.
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Evidence of the failure of counterterrorism strategies is
ample. The government has failed to prevent some of the
most serious attempted terrorist plots over the past few
years. But for a fortuitous technical failure and the rapid
response of a Muslim Mauritanian reporting the smoke,
thousands of people could have been killed in Times
Square. Similarly, the Nigerian Christmas Day bomber
would have successfully killed hundreds on an airplane
headed for Detroit if his bomb had not failed to ignite.
White supremacist James Cummings83 was actively
constructing a lethal dirty bomb at home undetected
by the FBI. Only after his wife shot him in self-defense
did the government discover his terrorist plot. In other
cases, terrorists succeeded in terrorizing the American
public without government intervention. Joseph Stack
flew an airplane into an IRS building in Austin, Texas,
in protest of IRS demands that he pay his taxes.84 His
terrorist attack killed an IRS employee who was a military
veteran. Had the attack occurred at a different time of
day, hundreds of IRS employees could have been killed.
Jared Lee Loughner shot Congresswoman Gabrielle
Giffords (D-AZ) and killed six people due to both his
mental illness and questionable political objectives.85
While countering terrorism is no easy feat, it is
remarkable that the government was unable to prevent
these attacks after having invested so many resources
into counterterrorism, often at the expense of the
civil liberties of all Americans. Despite the creation of
numerous fusion centers nationwide, the relaxation of
surveillance laws,86 the use of technology to surveil nearly
every aspect of life in this country, and the reallocation
of thousands of agents to countering terrorism, the
government has yet to show results proportionate to
the monumental vested resources. In the apt words of
David Cole and Jules Lobel, we have become both less
safe and less free.87
What these strategies accomplish quite well is the
stigmatization of more than 6 million Muslims in the
United States because of the illegal acts of a handful of
Muslims – some of whom are foreign and have no ties
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whatsoever to this country. Many American Muslims feel
that they live a second-class existence because their
houses of worship are more likely than others’ to be under
surveillance and monitored. Their Internet activity is more
likely to be under heightened scrutiny for any signs of
political dissent. Their religious practices are under the
microscope by purported terrorist experts who cannot
tell the difference between orthodox Islamic practices
and bona fide terrorist activity.88 And, Muslim women’s
religious headwear is perceived as an insignia for terrorist
inclinations that justify discriminatory treatment.89
Predictably, what started out as a focus on vulnerable
religious and racial minorities has now spread to a
broader segment of Americans. Laws prohibiting
material support to terrorism that were initially applied to
Muslim individuals and institutions are increasingly being
enforced against various individuals and institutions
engaged in humanitarian aid, peace building, and human
rights advocacy. Non-Muslim activist groups who have
been engaged in legitimate advocacy for decades are
now being targeted for investigation and potential
prosecution pursuant to material support to terrorism
laws.90 A combination of public apathy about the state
of civil liberties, pervasive stereotypes of Muslims as
terrorists, and government misinformation about the
efficacy of counterterrorism policies has facilitated
increased surveillance and investigative authorities
commonly found in police states.91
Perhaps the most troubling factor in recent national
security discourse is the increasingly alarmist and overtly
biased collective categorization of Muslims as terrorists.
Specifically, Representative Peter King’s (R-NY) recent
Congressional hearings, characterized as a political
circus by some, legitimized America’s worst fears.92
That American Muslims are so distrusted as to warrant
hearings focused solely on questioning their loyalty is
reminiscent of our nation’s collective punishment of
Japanese Americans during WWII.
The silver lining in the disconcerting homegrown
terrorism debates is the broad coalition of groups
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that rejected King’s presumptions of collective guilt
on Muslims on account of the bad acts of a few.
Christian, Jewish, and civil rights groups representing
a diversity of demographics challenged the merits of
limiting “homegrown terrorism” to terrorism committed
only by Muslims.93
Unfortunately, insufficient attention was paid to the
importance of allowing Muslims, and all Americans in
general, to express political dissent openly despite the
unpopularity of their views. Instead, Muslim groups
and their allies sought to reassure political leaders
and a suspicious public of the Muslim Americans’
undying loyalty to the nation and their status as “model
minorities.”94 Rather than focusing on the right of
Americans, including Muslims, to be radical so long as
their activities do not violate the law, the Muslim groups
and their allies adopted King’s narrative to shape Muslim
political beliefs and religious practices in accordance
with a definition of a citizen who is passive toward their
government. Indeed, the homegrown terrorism hearings
were a missed opportunity to shift the focus on the
fundamental American principle to hold unpopular or
controversial views, rather than to prove the innocence
of a suspected religious minority.
It is long past time for the government to reassess
the successes and failures of its counterterrorism
policies over the past ten years. Are we safer, or have
we just been lucky? Has the PATRIOT Act made our
government better able to prevent terrorism? Is it time for
Americans, as members of Congress have proclaimed,
to thoughtfully debate the Act’s efficacy and whether
its infringements on all Americans’ civil liberties are
warranted?95 Are we seeking to rationalize our forfeiture
of civil liberties by convincing ourselves that our national
security policies work, irrespective of the facts on the
ground? If we cannot answer these questions with
concrete evidence, then we have little to show for the
last ten years of significant government expenditure,
public anxiety, and the high civil liberties costs imposed
on a significant number of Americans.
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In light of our nation’s checkered civil rights record
and ample opportunity to learn from the past, there is
simply no excuse for repeating the same mistakes on
yet another different and vulnerable minority group.
Preventing a terrorist attack need not come at the
expense of vilifying a religious minority. Nor should
it require sacrificing this country’s most fundamental
civil rights and liberties.
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